UIC Law Review
Volume 49

Issue 3

Article 1

Spring 2016

The Political Economy of Corporate Financial Regulatory
Legislation, 49 J. Marshall L. Rev. 679 (2016)
Michael Patrick Wilt

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Patrick Wilt, The Political Economy of Corporate Financial Regulatory Legislation, 49 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 679 (2016)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol49/iss3/1
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For more
information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CORPORATE FINANCIAL REGULATORY
LEGISLATION
MICHAEL PATRICK WILT, J.D, LL.M. *
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................679
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT AND SARBANES OXLEY..................................682
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977...........................683
B. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 ..........................................687
III. INTEREST GROUP POLITICS DEFINED .....................................692
A. Public Interest Theory of Regulation .............................692
B. Capture Theory of Regulation .......................................693
C. Interest Group Theory of Regulation .............................694
IV. INTEREST GROUP IMPACT ON FEDERAL CORPORATE
FINANCIAL REGULATORY LEGISLATION: DID BUSINESS
HAVE AN IMPACT?................................................................695
A. The Business Community .............................................696
B. The Accounting Industry and Regulators ......................698
1. Supply and Demand of Regulation ..........................698
2. Homogeneity of Interests ........................................699
3. Coordination Costs .................................................699
4. Cartelization is Unfeasible or Highly Costly ...........700
5. Barriers to Entry ....................................................700
6. Supra-Com petitive Pricing......................................701
V. EFFECT OF FCPA AND SOX ON BUSINESSES...........................701
VI. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................705

I.

I NTRODUCTION

Businesses should consider the manner in which and the
reasons why they lobby Congress. This is especially important
when Congress is considering imposing new corporate financial
regulations. Although white-collar crime and the regulation of the
corporate world has come to the attention of congressional
policymakers, especially following the Enron and Arthur Anderson
scandal in 2001, 1 there is little scholarship on the connection
between the passage of new corporate financial regulations by
Congress and the political actions of businesses affected by those
new laws. What did businesses want and how did they seek to
persuade policymakers in Congress to adopt their view – and were
they successful? While a theoretical understanding of why
business interest groups are motivated to lobby are useful,
historical accounts of their actions can serve as a valuable tool to

* Wilt is Senior Policy Writer and Editor at the Mercatus Center at George
Mason University. Special thanks to Jeffrey Eisenach, Adjunct Professor at
George Mason University School of Law, for providing comments and feedback
on an earlier draft of this article.
1. Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political
Economy Analysis, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 95 (2004).
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guide future legislative strategies. What impact can a generalized
community, e.g., big business interests, have on legislative
direction? Do specific industries tend to benefit more than others
from corporate financial regulatory legislation?
One recent major federal debate on corporate financial
regulation occurred in 2002 following the Enron and Arthur
Anderson scandal. Congress and the Bush administration created
a Department of Justice special task force to investigate white
collar crime and to reassure the American people that something
was being done about the excesses of Wall Street and their impact
on the economy. 2 Congress also passed the Sarbanes Oxley (SOX)
law in 2002, with the goal of reigning in accounting fraud across
the corporate world and granting the Securities and Exchange
Commission greater power to regulate publicly traded companies. 3
This legislation was not the government’s first attempt at
corporate financial regulation. 4 Typically, the federal government
passes corporate financial regulation as a reactionary measure to
scandals involving corporate misconduct. As such, Congress
seemingly passes a new, massive corporate financial regulatory
bill every decade. 5 These bills are typically enforced by DOJ or an
administrative agency such as the SEC – or multiple agencies. 6
Following the financial crisis of 2008, the Congress passed – and
2. President’s Corporate Fraud Task Force, U.S. Department of Justice,
www.justice.gov/archive/dag/cftf/.
3. Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Sarbanes Oxley Debacle: What
We've Learned; How to Fix It, AEI LIABILITY STUDIES 2006,
www.aei.org/files/2006/03/13/20060308_ButlerRibsteinSOX Draft313.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act,
103 Stat. 183.
5. See Khanna, supra note 1, at 96. Khanna argues that “corporations and
business interests are considered some of the most, if not the most, powerful
and effective lobbyists in the country,” but then wonders why there has been
an expansion in corporate criminalization (noting that there are over 300,000
federal regulatory offenses that are criminal in nature). See also Samuel W.
Buell, Is the White Collar Offender Privileged?, 63 DUKE L.J. 823, 873 (2014)
(“One might even argue that the symbiosis working against the criminal
offender can be more powerful in the case of the corporate violator. It is not
just mutually beneficial to legislators and executive -branch officials to be
tough on corporate crime. It benefits firms too, because the focus on ex post
punishment directs discussion about responses and remedies away from ex
ante regulation. Accounts focused on bad apples and wrongdoers crowd out
ones about systemic failure. Tough prosecution of individual miscreants
strengthens the argument for leniency against firms themselves and their
many “innocent” stakeholders. These approaches benefit large private
institutions determined to hold down costs of doing business. And the
perception of toughness benefits legislators, and executive-branch rulemakers
and enforcers, who prefer to avoid blame for failing to prevent wrongdoing
through regulation. It should not be surprising that the Bush administration
from 2001 to 2009 had a record of both hostility to business regulation and
aggressiveness in criminal prosecution of senior executives of large
corporations.”).
6. Khanna, supra note 1, at 99-100.
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the Obama administration has sought to vigorously enforce –
regulations on Wall Street. 7 Violations of these new laws can
result in criminal penalties. 8 While no high-level executive has
been indicted for his or her role in the 2008 financial crisis, 9 it is
likely only a matter of time before a new financial scandal emerges
and another law is deemed to be necessary. Another important
consideration is the long-term impact of compliance and
enforcement that these laws have on smaller business and the
groups that stand to benefit from new, complex regulations. 10
When the next corporate scandal emerges, business interests –
and legislators who wish not to bend to their will – should look to
the past as prologue.
This article will discuss corporate financial regulatory
legislation and its enforcement at the federal level in light of
interest group politics and will seek to develop a better
understanding of how federal corporate financial regulatory
legislation is enacted by examining legislative history. The goal of
this article is to provide an overview of the legislative history of
two important laws (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
Sarbanes Oxley Act) and how interest group politics affected their
passage. “Business” interests (in general) are different from the
interests of the accounting industry, and both interest groups will
be considered. Unlike most large corporations, the accounting
industry, specifically, stood to benefit from additional regulation.
Legislative history gives insight into the motivations of many
groups, but can also show that some interest groups are more
motivated than others to persuade policymakers to adopt their
view – or at least, reject a less desirable policy position.
The article will proceed as follows: Part II examines the
legislative and political history of the FCPA and SOX, their civil
and criminal components, and how various interest groups
approached the enactment of both laws. Part III will explain the
different classical theories of regulation as defined in Richard
Posner’s seminal article on the topic. Part IV will apply the
interest group theory of regulation to the passage of both the
FCPA and SOX. Finally, Part V will consider how the FCPA and

7. Tiffany M. Joslyn, Criminal Provisions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform & Consumer Protection Act, NEW FEDERAL INITIATIVES PROJECT, THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY, Dec. 10, 2010, www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail
/criminal-provisions-in-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-consumerprotection-act.
8. Id.
9. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV . OF BOOKS , Jan. 9, 2014, www.nybooks.com
/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/fin ancial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/.
10. See Stephen Primack, The Financial Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on Small vs. Large US Public Companies, DEP’T OF ECON., UNIV . OF CAL
BERKELEY,
(Spring
2012),
http://live.econ.berkeley.edu/sites/default/
files/Primack.pdf.
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SOX have had a long-term effect on the business community,
especially smaller businesses.
Ultimately, this article concludes that particular interest
groups and their representatives, notably the accounting industry,
influenced the scope and definition of these laws, but that the laws
still passed because business interests were not united,
homogenous, or incentivized enough to adequately oppose them or
alter the direction in which the Congress chose to act. Two
observations are derived from this analysis: the profession
arguably most responsible for corporate accounting fraud – the
accountants – was homogenous, well-coordinated, and strong
enough to gain additional institutional protections for their
profession, barriers to entry for potential competitors, and
economic advantages through the passage of the FCPA and SOX.
Moreover, these two laws are among the most worrisome on the
books for corporate general counsel. 11 This suggests that corporate
interest group lobbyists may not possess as much power to
influence policy when political sentiment insists that “something
must be done” to curb perceived business wrongdoing.
Additionally, the business community has felt a substantial
negative impact from compliance with and enforcement of both the
FCPA and SOX, in both a civil and criminal capacity. The relative
effectiveness of “the business community” in shaping corporate
regulatory legislation (or shielding themselves from it) appears to
be greatly overestimated. When attempting to thwart new
corporate financial regulations, the effectiveness of the general
“business community” cannot compare to the efforts of those in
favor of such regulation or who stand to benefit from it.

II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT AND SARBANES OXLEY
Congress involved itself in emerging corporate scandals
several times during this nation’s history. Examples of this include
the 1929 stock market crash, the savings and loan scandal of the
early 1990’s, and the 2008 financial crisis. This article examines
laws passed in response to two other financial scandals: the
foreign bribery of the 1970’s and the corporate accounting and
fraud of the early 2000’s. Congress passed two laws in response to
these scandals: the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
Sarbanes Oxley Act. While each Act addressed separate instances
of corporate malfeasance, they shared one core problem: heavy
scrutiny of accounting practices from the media, Congress, and
policymakers. In response to this increased scrutiny, both laws
11. FTI Journal, The Legal Risks that Keep Directors and General Counsels
Awake,
(Mar.
2013),
www.fticonsulting.com/global2/critical-thinking/ftijournal/the-legal-risks-that-keep-directors-and-general-counsels-awake.aspx.
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implemented additional requirements, reviews, and systems for
corporate accounting practices, in a huge boon to the very industry
most responsible for the very problems about which the country
was worried. Additionally, outside of the accounting industry,
strategy and opinion as to the need for and content of these laws
was mixed, resulting in less effective opposition to and influence
on the structure of both the FCPA and SOX. Interest group theory,
as discussed in Part IV, predicts that the more organized and
homogenous group – accountants – would triumph over the less
organized and homogenous group, business in general.

A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 to
prevent corporate bribery of foreign officials. 12 The Act contains
three main provisions: a books and records requirement, an
internal accounting requirement, and a prohibition on bribery of
foreign officials. The law was enacted after revelations that
American corporations were bribing foreign government officials
across all industries, during a “morality oriented post-Watergate
atmosphere” in the mid-1970’s. 13 The revelations of “slush funds
and secret payments by American corporations were stated to
have adversely affected American foreign policy, damaged the
image of American democracy abroad, and impaired public
confidence in the financial integrity of American corporations.”14
Before the Congress began debating the relative merits of
proposals on how to deal with bribery, it heard testimony on
whether a problem with bribery actually existed and how it should
be addressed. 15 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, while supporting
voluntary disclosure (at the time, already provided for by law),
opposed “new legislation… to confront the problems caused by
questionable overseas payments.”16 The National Association of
Manufacturers also opposed new law. 17 However, legislators held
the “prevailing view . . . that existing laws were deficient.”18 With

12. Michael V. Seitzinger, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA):
Congressional Interest and Executive Enforcement, CONG. RES . SERV . (Oct. 21,
2010), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41466.pdf.
13. Mark Romaneski, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An
Analysis of Its Impact and Uncertain Future, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV . 405
(1982),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1567&
context=iclr.
14. Michael V. Seitzinger, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: CRS Report to
Congress, CONG. RES . SERV . (Mar. 3, 1999), www.fas.org/irp/crs/Crsfcpa.htm.
15. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 O HIO
ST. L. J. 929, 959 (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 960.
18. Id.
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this in mind, how did these business interests affect the passage of
the FCPA?
Congress considered two competing options to remedy the
apparent problem: a system of criminal prosecution for bribery
and a system of reporting and disclosure. 19 The Department of
State supported the latter option, while the Carter administration
supported a mixture of criminal prosecution and more stringent
reporting and disclosure. 20 Ultimately, Congress chose a
criminalization approach. Corporations may have preferred the
criminalization approach over the reporting and disclosure
system. 21 Who were these groups and why would they support
such a system? The Committee Report from the House of
Representative’s consideration of the bill explains the latter
question quite succinctly:
Most importantly, though, criminalization is far less burdensome on
business. Most disclosure proposals would require U.S. corporations
doing business abroad to report all foreign payments including
perfectly legal payments such as for promotional purposes and for
sales commissions. A disclosure scheme, unlike outright prohibition,
would require U.S. corporations to contend not only with an
additional bureaucratic overlay but also with massive paperwork
requirements.22

The minority report opposed a criminalization approach,
arguing:
We believe that legislation that cannot be effectively enforced will do
little to deter payoffs. On the other hand, disclosure could be a very
effective deterrent especially in combination with the other
sanctions against such payments which exist in present securities,
antitrust, tax and criminal law. We are concerned that the
committee may have constructed a paper tiger which in the long run
will do little to discourage conduct which we all believe has no place
in the American business community.23

Some argued that the existence of “criminal penalties for
certain questionable payments would deter their disclosure and
thus the positive value of the disclosure provisions would be
reduced,” and that both approaches could not be implemented at
the same time. 24 Additionally, the Ford administration’s task force
on bribery was skeptical of enforcing criminal provisions.25
Ultimately, the disclosure approach failed to gain traction and the

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Khanna, supra note 1, at 115-20.
22. H. Rep. No. 95-640, at 5 (1977), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa
/history/1977/houseprt-95-640.pdf.
23. Id. at 10.
24. Koehler, supra note 15, at 989.
25. Id.
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criminalization approach was adopted due to its supposed
efficiency and a lower compliance cost burden on business. 26
Those presenting testimony at the 1976 sub-committee
hearings included “the American Association of Certified Public
Accounts, public interest groups and the Bar.” 27 According to the
Senate report on the bill, the American Bankers Association and
the Securities Industry Association also presented testimony.28
The most interesting opposition to the legislation came a year
later, from the Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers, both of which opposed the proposed
law. 29 Both organizations submitted statements for the Record in
April 1977 opposing H.R. 3815, the Unlawful Corporate Payments
Act of 1977.30 This bill was eventually codified into law as the
FCPA. 31
In addition to the criminal penalties of the FCPA, the Act also
included the books and records and internal control provisions, all
of which are overseen by accountants and auditing professionals. 32
Representatives testified in Congress on behalf of the accounting
profession. 33 In 1976, the President of the American Institute for
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) testified at a hearing on
corporate responsibility that the “increased interest and visibility
has resulted in large part from a growing recognition of the
importance of obtaining assurance regarding the reliability of
corporate financial statements.”34
Later in 1976, the Chairman of the AICPA’s Committee on
SEC Regulations testified regarding foreign bribery, and the books
and records provision of the pending legislation. 35 AICPA
26. Id. at 997, citing S. Rep. No. 93-114, at 10 (1977) (“Direct
criminalization entails no reporting burden on corporations and less of an
enforcement burden on the Government.”). “A disclosure scheme, unlike
outright prohibition, would require U.S. corporations to contend not only with
an additional bureaucratic overlay but also with massive paperwork
requirements.” Id. at 997.
27. Id.
28. S. Rep. No. 95-114, at 2 (1977), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
history/1977/senaterpt-95-114.pdf.
29. Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977: Hearing on H.R. 3815
Before the Subcomm. On Consumer Finance and Protection of the H. Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 234-51 (1977) (statement of
Chamber of Commerce of the United States and National Association of
Manufacturers).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
33. See, e.g., Corporate Rights and Responsibilities: Hearing Before the S.
Comm on Commerce, 94th Cong. 120 (1976) (statement of Wallace E. Olso n
and the American Institute for Certified Public Accountants).
34. Id.
35. Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearing on H.R. 15481 and S. 3664 and
H.R. 13870 and H.R. 13953, Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection
and Finance of the H. Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.
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supported the law, but stressed that previous instances of bribery
were circumventions of “internal accounting controls,” not a
reflection on the adequacy of those controls.36 AICPA opposed
requiring “adequate” internal accounting controls, but did support
having the law require that the books and records of a corporate
issuer of securities reflect its transactions and make it unlawful to
falsify or circumvent the internal accounting controls. 37 Although
AICPA failed to lobby against the “adequate” controls provision in
the original bill, the word “adequate” was removed in the next
decade through amendments to the FCPA. 38 Corporations are
required to have internal accounting controls, which are
sufficiently reasonable to assure that statements are accurate and
true to this day.39 Corporations and their financial staff, including
accountants, are responsible for creating and enforcing these
controls. 40 During the FCPA debate, the committee requested the
AICPA’s response to the following question:
You indicate on page 4 that the internal accounting control
provision could be counter-productive since lawyers would advise
their clients not to seek suggestions from internal and outside
auditors and others. Wouldn't this more likely place an extra
incentive on the issuer to seek third party advice as to the adequacy
of his controls?41

To which the AICPA responded, in part:
I would conjecture that issuers might well turn more to the legal
profession than to the accounting profession for advice as to
compliance with a legislative requirement calling for an "adequate"
internal control system. The outgrowth of this might well involve a
checklist-type approach to the problem, or a general standardization
of systems characteristics, developed by the legal profession, to
guide issuers in ascertaining compliance with the new law.
Constructive criticism of those with real insight into the intricacies
of internal controls would neither be solicited nor welcomed in such
a legalistic approach. The result would be, unfortunately, an
attempt by companies to attain a system that meets a minimal legal

158 (1976) (statement of Thomas L. Holton and the American Institute for
Certified Public Accountants).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Anti-Bribery and Books & Records Provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 22, 2004),
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/fcpa-english.pdf.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b).
40. See, e.g., Guide to Internal Control Over Financial Report, Center for
Audit Quality 7 (“While management structures vary, in many companies, the
Chief Financial Officer or the Chief Accounting Officer and his or her staff
have day-to-day responsibility for ICFR.”), www.thecaq.org/docs/reports-andpublications/caq_icfr_042513.pdf?sfvrsn=2.
41. Hearing before S. Comm, supra note 33, at 162.
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standard rather than to attain the best system suitable to the
circumstances.42

Either seems plausible, but it is not unreasonable to speculate
that both auditors and lawyers would be consulted as part of a
corporate manager’s due diligence in seeking the best advice. Why
did the AICPA oppose including this provision? It professed to seek
the “best system suitable” to the circumstances. Perhaps its
motivation was pure, as public interest theory of regulation might
suggest: regulation is primarily created to serve the best interests
of society.43 On the other hand, perhaps AICPA feared a loss of
business to the lawyers, as the above response implies. The
Congress ignored this fear and enacted the adequate internal
accounting provision into law. 44

B. Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
The Sarbanes Oxley Act, colloquially known as SOX, is a
complex law, considered to be the “most sweeping federal
securities legislation since the original laws in 1933 and 1934.” 45
In 2001 and 2002, there were mounting reports of corporate fraud
and bad accounting practices at major corporations, such as Enron
and WorldCom. 46 The law accomplishes several objectives
including: increased internal monitoring, including certification of
reports with criminal penalties for reckless certification by the
CEO; protection of whistleblowers; a code of ethics for financial
officers; increased independence of auditors and creation of an
independent Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB); new disclosure rules relating to firm structure, code of
ethics, off-balance-sheet transactions; prohibition on loans to
insiders; and, additional regulation of securities analysts to ensure
that they are independent from firm investment banking
activities. 47
In 2002, both houses of Congress considered several different
bills relating to corporate accounting and governance practices and
held multiple hearings in both the Senate committee chaired by
Senator Paul Sarbanes and the House committee chaired by
Congressman Michael Oxley. Oxley’s less restrictive bill passed

42. Id. at 163.
43. See infra Part III.
44. Koehler, supra note 15, at 998 (“The prevailing view was that the
criminalization approach embodied in S. 305 and H.R. 3815, along with
supplemental books and records and internal control provisions that were
agreed to in conference, represented the best legislative response to the
foreign corporate payments problem.”).
45. Butler, supra note 3, at 8.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 23.

688

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:679

the House in April 2002. 48 However, the Senate version sponsored
by Sen. Sarbanes ultimately passed and most of its stronger
provisions were agreed upon in conference committee. 49 President
Bush signed the law on July 30, 2002, describing it as “the most
far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time
of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.”50 Unlike the House bill, which
included tougher criminal penalties and an accounting industry
watchdog, the Senate bill also included “several more
consequential corporate governance measures, including a
prohibition on executive loans, requiring audit committee
independence, and executive certification of financial statements”
under penalty of law. 51
Business interests did not entirely oppose passage of the law.
Under the weight of intense media and political pressure, it was
reasonable to expect that major corporations would be willing to do
anything to move past the corporate accounting scandal. In any
event, the larger firms knew that they had the resources to defend
against and comply with any new law that may be passed by
Congress. 52 This knowledge could explain why the Business
Roundtable did not oppose SOX. 53 Business Roundtable
“represented big business,” and may have believed that letting the
law pass would remove the spotlight from them as quickly as
possible, a solid public relations move. 54 Firms may have
supported or at least not vigorously opposed SOX because it
appeased public opinion and was seen as largely symbolic. 55 Given
the relatively few criminal prosecutions resulting from SOX, it is
difficult to argue with the conclusion that it was symbolic, at least
with regard to the criminal provisions. 56
The Chamber of Commerce did oppose the law, and argued
that their membership is comprised of smaller firms, who were

48. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., GOP Bill on Auditing Clears House, Apr. 25,
2002, N.Y. TIMES , www.nytimes.com/2002/04/25/business/gop-bill-on-auditingclears-house.html.
49. See Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Have a Future?, 26
YALE J. ON REG. 229, 238 (2009) (“And when the bill that emerged from the
conference committee was the Democratic Senate's version, all but three
House Republicans voted for it.”), http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=yjreg.
50. Butler, supra note 3, at 13.
51. Id. at 22-23.
52. For a review of the literature on the cost differential between small and
large firms, see, e.g., Suraj Srinivasan and John C. Coates IV, SOX after Ten
Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 627 (2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343108.
53. Butler, supra note 3, at 16.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 17.
56. Kevin Drawbaugh & Dena Aubin, Analysis: A decade on, is SarbanesOxley
working?,
REUTERS ,
(July
30,
2012),
www.reuters.com
/article/2012/07/30/us-financial-sarbox- idUSBRE86Q1BY20120730.
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less responsible for the accounting fraud and more likely to incur
the significant costs in monitoring and compliance. 57 The Chamber
represented a heterogeneous membership with no specific industry
or even tier of market capitalization, ranging from small to large
businesses. 58 The National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB), which primarily represented small, mostly privately held
firms, also opposed the application of SOX on behalf of their
members. 59 The President of the National Association of
Manufacturers (NAM), Jerry J. Jasinowski, testified before
Congress and while not explicitly endorsing the legislation, did say
that Oxley’s bill “provides the framework for the kind of reform –
thoughtful balanced reform that we need.” 60 However, Jasinowski
urged against the creation of a “whole new set of laws” such as
“measures which will do real harm; that is, to produce a lot of new
legislation, new liabilities, try to reinvent the wheel.”61 NAM was
worried about “new liability provisions” and “increases in costs” for
business. 62 NAM did not testify before the Senate with regard to
its more stringent bill, 63 and based upon these comments, likely
would have opposed some of the bill.
Franklin D. Raines, then Chairman and CEO of Fannie Mae
and Chairman of the Business Roundtable Corporate Task Force,
testified that “some legislation and regulatory changes are
necessary.”64 In its written submission, the Business Roundtable
expressed a mix of concerns and support for the pending
legislation, but also specifically expressed concern with any
attempts to alter or repeal the PSLRA (Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act). 65 The Business Roundtable “oppose[d] the
provisions of other bills that weaken the protections of the
PSLRA.”66 As Professor Khanna explains in his article, the
increased civil liability of the kind feared by both the Business

57. Butler, supra note 3, at 16. See also Gail R. Chaddock, Corporate Fraud
Under
Seige,
CHRISTIAN
SCI .
MONITOR
(July
11,
2002),
www.csmonitor.com/2002/0711/p02s02-uspo.html (“The Sarbanes bill will
hand American corporations back to the trial lawyers for summary execution,"
said Thomas Donohue, President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
58. Butler, supra note 3, at 16.
59. Karen Harned, Congress Never Intended to Subject Mom-and-Pop
Shops to
Sarbanes-Oxley, THE DAILY CALLER (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://dailycaller.com/2013/11/12/congress-never-intended-to-subject-mom-andpop-shops-to-sarbanes-oxley/.
60. The Corporate Auditing, Accounting, Responsibility, and Transparency
Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services ,
107th Cong. 106 (2002) (statement of Jerry J. Jasinowski), www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-107hhrg78501/pdf/CHRG-107hhrg78501.pdf.
61. Id. at 107.
62. Id. at 107.
63. Hearing Before S. Comm, supra note 33.
64. See Hearing, supra note 60, at 101 (Statement of Franklin D. Raines).
65. Id.
66. Id.
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Roundtable and NAM, may have led them to express only
lukewarm support for the host of accounting, auditing, and
criminal provisions that ultimately were signed into law as SOX. 67
The Council of Institutional Investors, represented by its
Executive Director Sarah Teslik, argued that it would be more
beneficial to investors (and the economy as a whole) if
management was put in jail rather than merely having the
corporation fined. 68 It is not unreasonable to believe that investors
would prefer increased individual corporate criminal sanctions to
civil liability or corporate fines, which affect the bottom line of the
company more than a manager being fired and sent to prison for
fraud.
One group that effectively lobbied for and influenced the
passage of SOX was the accounting industry. Judge Easterbook
commented that:
The accounting profession is highly concentrated and has learned
that it can get benefits at the national level. The Sarbanes -Oxley
Act increased the amounts corporations pay for accounting services.
Does it surprise you that, after multiple scandals showed that
accountants were not very good at detecting or preventing fraud,
new legislation required firms to purchase more accounting
services? Why buy more of a low-quality good? But if you think in
public-choice terms, it should not surprise you that accounting
failures become a means by which resources are transferred from
investors to accountants.69

SOX’s legislative hearings bear this conclusion out. It is true
that the “more vocal business supporters of SOX were the
accountants and others in the monitoring and consulting industry
who audit, investigate, prosecute and defend fraud as well as
prepare disclosure documents.”70 The fact that the accounting
industry would benefit from increased compliance costs,
regulation, and subsequent barriers to entry is not a surprise, and
it should not be a surprise that SOX was an advantageous bill for
the industry.
The business community did not vigorously oppose SOX,
which, politically speaking, made sense. The Republican
congressmen were in election-mode and may have been more
willing to appear tough on crime than help protect business.
Businesses were perhaps resigned to the fact that something was
67. See infra Part IV.
68. “[W]ill you be more deterred by thought that your company may be
fined or by the thought you may go to jail?”. Accounting and Investor
Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearing
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong.
(statement of Sarah Teslik and the Council for Institutional Investors),
www.banking.senate.gov/02_03hrg/032002/teslik.htm.
69. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate
Governance, 95 VA. L. REV . 685, 698 (2009).
70. Butler, supra note 3, at 16.
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going to be done. 71 If fighting against increased civil liability was
the best outcome they could hope for, as Khanna argues, 72 it
appears they were successful. 73 The lack of a united front and one
voice permitted political realities to dictate passage of the stronger
Senate bill, as the clock ticked down on the election year. 74 The
White House pressured a quick compromise, and there was a rush
to support the harsher of the two bills in conference between the
House and Senate. 75 With regard to SOX, it appears that
71. Id. at 14 (“Facing midterm elections in November, the party controlling
the White House and identified with business stood to lose much more than
the Democrats as the result of any public ire about the economy and corporate
misconduct.”).
72. Professor Khanna has a conclusive take on interest group politics and
the passage of the FCPA and SOX. Khanna concludes that “[c]orporate crime
legislation may be the preferred response for some corporate interests because
it satisfies public outcry while imposing relatively low costs on those interests,
thereby avoiding legislative and judicial responses that are more harmful to
their interests and sometimes deflecting criminal liability away from
managers and executives and onto corporations.” Khanna focuses on the
groups that would “normally oppose regulation” and argues that “these groups
may often prefer corporate crime legislation of corporate civil liability.” The
substitution thesis is simple: corporations and its managers prefer corporate
crime legislation to civil liability because the costs are lower and the certainty
is greater. Khanna acknowledges – as this article’s review of the legislative
history of FCPA and SOX prove – that a smoking gun “memo” or “direct
documentary evidence indicating that corporate interests ignored or supported
corporate crime legislation in order to avoid increases in corporate civil
liability.” Khanna argues that there is a “pattern” over time that has
developed indicating lobbying activities and preferences of corporate interests.
See Khanna, supra note 1, at 115-20.
73. However, some have argued that SOX actually did increase civil
regulation and liability. “[I]t is worth pausing to observe that the Republican
effort to divert legislative energy from civil regulatory to punitive criminal
measures largely failed. Although legislators seeking a strong regulatory
response to corporate scandals may not have gotten everything they wanted,
they got most of it-and far more than either the House (and many Senate)
Republicans or the White House would have preferred. Moreover, once the
Republicans entered the competition to see who could create the toughest
criminal sanctions, there was no turning back. The ironic result was that by
adopting the White House diversionary strategy of focusing on criminal
remedies, the Republican leadership, which originally sought relatively weak
regulation and no additional criminal penalties for corporate wrongdoers, was
ultimately obliged to accede to legislation containing both relatively strong
regulatory remedies and potentially very punitive criminal provisions.” See
Frank O. Bowman, III, Our Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of The Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed , 1 O HIO ST. J. CRIM .
L. 373, 402 (2004). Perhaps SOX’s civil regulatory provisions, coupled with the
“punitive” criminal provisions, imposes greater costs in the long-run than a
simple repeal or alteration of PSLRA would have imposed. If that is so, then
Khanna’s argument with regard to less vigorous opposition to SOX would not
hold water, unless business interests were either nearsighted or were
confronted with a “pick your method of execution” choice.
74. Butler, supra note 3, at 18.
75. Id.
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Republicans may have ignored business interests, but the interest
groups themselves did not put up quite enough of a vigorous fight.
Perhaps they believed that SOX was more symbolic, heavy on
rhetoric but light on actual reform, such as repealing PSLRA or
other securities laws that protected corporations, as some have
argued.76

III. I NTEREST GROUP POLITICS DEFINED
Richard Posner’s article, Theories of Economic Regulation,77
applies simple concepts such as supply, demand, and cartel theory
to help the reader understand how interest groups affect the
regulatory
decision-making
process,
from
inception
to
enforcement. Before explaining the interest group theory of
regulation, it is important to explain earlier theories of regulation
that have since been called into question: public interest theory
and capture theory.

A. Public Interest Theory of Regulation
Public interest theory is the original basis for regulation in
this country. 78 The essential point of this theory is that regulators
act in the best interests of the public when they see a problem with
a market (such as a market failure), and that government
regulation does not cost anything. 79 If there is a market
imperfection, government can fix it. 80 Of course, we now know that
government regulations do indeed have costs, and that those costs
may be even greater than the cost of letting a market sort itself
out. 81
Additionally, perhaps the biggest problem with the theory is
trying to determine what, exactly, is the public interest. As Posner
points out, public interest theory fails to link the perception of the

76. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy
Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REV . 915 (2003),
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1538&context=facu
lty_publications. But see Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1587 (2005)
(“[T]he mandates are not costless (as one would expect legislation that is
intentionally symbolic to be). In particular, compliance costs to meet the
certification requirement appear to be considerable, especially for smaller
firms.”). Romano argues that the bill couldn’t possibly be seen as merely
symbolic, given its high compliance costs.
77. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL. J. ECON.
& MGMT. SCI . 335 (1974).
78. Id. at 335.
79. Id. at 336.
80. Id. at 336.
81. Id. at 336.
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public interest to actual legislative action. 82 Unless one hundred
percent of the people all agree upon the public interest, it is
possible that the “public interest” deemed by the majority may end
up having a greater cost imposed on the minority than the benefit
derived by the majority, resulting in a welfare loss. 83
Posner suggests that, perhaps due to collusion among
politicians, there may be an opportunity for those politicians to
impose their own views on society, and that this results in policies
that are adopted based upon what the “public interest” is as
conceived by those politicians. 84 But other theories may be more
appropriate to explain regulatory action.

B. Capture Theory of Regulation
The capture theory of regulation is a far more cynical
understanding of regulatory action. Essentially, as Posner
describes it, interest groups seek to promote their own interests,
often at the expense of the general public. 85 One formulation of the
theory is that big business and capitalists control the institutions
of society, including regulation, and that this benefits them. 86 Of
course, as Posner rightfully points out, plenty of smaller interests
and businesses benefit from regulation, rendering this view false. 87
The other more sophisticated version of capture theory is one
formulated by political scientists. This version holds that
regulatory agencies are, over time, captured by the very industries
they regulate. 88 Posner makes several arguments against capture
theory, arguing it is a hypothesis not backed by any real
theoretical foundation. 89 First, he points out that more than just
the industry itself can affect the agency. 90 Additionally, customers
of the regulated industry would be in a position to also capture the
agency. 91 He also points out that an industry strong enough to
capture an agency might be strong enough to prevent its creation
in the first place, and that capture theory doesn’t explain how
industries often procure and help create the agency from the
beginning. 92
Perhaps the biggest flaw with capture theory is that it is not
an analytical or predictive theory to explain regulatory outcomes.
In agencies that regulate separate industries, which have
82. Posner, supra note 77, at 340.
83. Id. at 340.
84. Id. at 340-41.
85. Id. at 341.
86. Id. at 341.
87. Posner, supra note 77, at 341.
88. Id. at 341.
89. Id. at 342.
90. Id. at 342.
91. Id. at 342.
92. Posner, supra note 77, at 342.
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conflicting interests, capture theory cannot explain how one
outcome is chosen over another. 93 Moreover, even in one industry
(for example, the airline industry and the Civil Aeronautics
Board), there are competing interests within the industry. 94
Capture theory does not explain how one outcome is chosen over
another, just that the Board is “captured” by the industry in some
vague sense of the word. 95
Of course, Posner also suggests that there is a “good deal of
evidence that the interests promoted by regulatory agencies are
frequently those of customer groups rather than those of regulated
firms themselves.”96 The inability to account for many regulations
that benefit customers over industry is a failure of “capture
theory.”97

C. Interest Group Theory of Regulation
The bulk of Posner’s focus is on what he calls the “economic
theory of regulation,” which could also be called interest group
theory of regulation. Unlike public interest theory, interest group
theory abandons the notion of pure intentions in legislative and
regulatory outcomes. 98 Like capture theory, the theory
acknowledges that politically powerful groups may capture an
agency, but it also acknowledges that these groups may not be the
industry itself. 99 Additionally, the interest group theory applies
the laws of supply and demand to regulation to help understand
why economic regulation “serves the private interests of politically
effective groups.”100
Posner believes economic regulation is a product supplied to
interest groups with a demand for the regulation. 101 That is the
economic theory of regulation in a nutshell. The theory is a
predictive, analytical theory that helps explain why certain
regulations are enacted, which groups benefit, and most
importantly, why those groups – rather than others – benefited
from the enactment of the regulation. 102 Additionally, the theory
applies to both regulation sought by industry and that thrust upon
it. 103 Onerous regulations, such as criminal sanctions discussed in
this article, also can be explained by the same theory that explains
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 342-43.
98. Posner, supra note 77, at 343.
99. Id. at 343.
100. Id. at 343.
101. Posner, supra note 77, at 344.
102. Id. at 343-44.
103. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL. J.
ECON. & MGMT. SCI . 3 (1971).
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the beneficial regulation. 104 Additionally, the theory can also apply
to regulations that are not just purely “economic” in nature.
Posner insists that “criminal laws… affect economic welfare no
less than the conventional forms of economic regulation, and it
seems arbitrary to exclude them from the analysis.” 105 Therefore,
examining corporate financial regulations that include criminal
provisions passed by Congress – using legislative history – is ripe
for analysis under Posner’s view.

IV. I NTEREST GROUP I MPACT ON FEDERAL CORPORATE
FINANCIAL REGULATORY LEGISLATION : DID BUSINESS
HAVE AN I MPACT?
The SOX and FCPA case studies should begin with an
understanding that merely showing that the laws benefited or
negatively impacted certain groups does not prove the economic
theory of regulation. As Posner puts it, this article must
“demonstrate that the characteristics and circumstances of the
interest groups were such that the economic theory would have
predicted that they, and not some other groups, would obtain the
regulation we observe them enjoying.”106 It is clear after
examining the FCPA and SOX that the particular characteristics
and circumstances of the general business lobby and specifically
the accounting profession, gravitated toward outcomes from both
pieces of legislation that could be predicted by the interest group
theory of regulation.
Posner argues that the economic theory can be used to
“explain why we so often observe protective legislation in…the
professions,” by which he means professions such as law,
accounting, medicine, etc. 107 As demonstrated earlier in this
article, the accounting profession was the target for reform in both
SOX and FCPA, but actively supported and helped shape the
debate over the internal controls, books and records, and other
accounting features of SOX and the FCPA. The general business
lobby, represented by trade associations such as the Chamber of
Commerce, NAM, and the Business Roundtable, were less
successful in lobbying against both laws, due to disunity and
political pressure. 108 The economic theory of regulation predicts
104. Id. at 3.
105. Posner, supra note 77, at 353.
106. Id. at 352.
107. Id. at 347.
108. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper Scissors: Choosing
the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 315 (2005) (“[a}mong the interest groups that may
influence congressional deliberations are associations comprised o f businesses
with joint or overlapping rulemaking interests, industry or trade groups,
professional associations, and other business interest organizations (e.g., the

696

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:679

why the accounting industry can be viewed as a winner from these
laws and business, generally, as a loser. The economic theory may
not predict why business would prefer criminal to civil liability,
but it could predict that if politically powerful and influential, the
business lobby should be able to shape pending legislation.

A. The Business Community
Some have characterized SOX as “emergency legislation,”
where attention is diminished among legislators and opportunities
for interest group influence are enhanced. 109 However, as
previously mentioned in this article, the business community was
divided over SOX, where the Business Roundtable (consisting of
large corporate members) supported the law, while the Chamber of
Commerce (with small-firms as members as well as large), opposed
it. 110 The Chamber of Commerce is politically powerful, but it has
great diversity of views within its own membership. It is
important to remember Posner’s caution that the “homogeneity of
interests in the regulation in question” is key. 111 It is not
surprising that the Chamber was politically weaker than the
Business Roundtable in an environment where the political winds
favored an immediate legislative fix. Larger corporations faced
lower coordination costs and greater homogeneity of interest –
escaping political pressure112 and a public relations disaster 113 –
that creates incentives to have the legislation pass. The Chamber’s
more diverse and numerous small-firm members did not have the
same ability to speak forcefully with one voice. Additionally, SOX
was not intended to affect small, privately-held firms. 114 This
explains why the Chamber’s membership lobbying efforts would be
weaker. 115 The economic theory of regulation predicts that an
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable.))”
109. Robert V. Adhieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance” in
Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV . 721, 728 (2005).
110. Romano, supra note 76, at 1564.
111. Posner, supra note 77, at 345.
112. See Romano, supra note 76, at 1567 (“[a]s a lobbyist for the Chamber
of Commerce, which opposed the Senate bill, put it, “When the WorldCom
scandal hit, it became, to me, a bit of a--a very different attitude and
atmosphere, if not a political tsunami . . .”).
113. Id. at 1565 (“A further source of divergence between the positions of
the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce may have been the
accounting scandals' concentration among the largest public corporations.
Roundtable members may have thought that by supporting the legislative
proposal perceived to be tougher on co rporate crime and accountability, they
would be distancing themselves in the public mind from scandal-tinged firms,
a factor of little moment to smaller businesses.”).
114. See Harned, supra note 59.
115. But see Romano, supra note 77, at 1565 (“The different positions of the
business umbrella organizations on the Senate bill can plausibly be explained
by the disparity in expected compliance costs for the organizations' members
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entity such as the Business Roundtable, with deeper pockets,
smaller numbers, and more homogeneous alignment of interests,
would be able to affect the passage of the legislation more than the
Chamber. The more homogenous and coordinated, the more likely
a group is able to affect legislative action.
The analysis for the FCPA is different. Although they
condemned foreign bribery, the business community took a fairly
consistent stance against the need for new legislation. Once it
became evident that legislation would occur, it appears that the
business community withdrew from the debate over whether
disclosure or criminalization would be a better choice. While
Khanna argues that businesses would prefer the latter, 116 the
legislative history does not indicate which alternative businesses
would have preferred Congress to enact.
While Khanna’s theory is entirely plausible, the key question
is why business interests were left on the sideline in the
construction and debate over the FCPA? Business interests seem
to have been in tacit agreement with much of the testimony in
opposition to the criminalization approach: it would be ineffective
and purely symbolic. Why oppose a law if it will not be enforced
against you? A disclosure system was quickly abandoned during
the legislative debate, 117 leaving businesses a choice to remain
silent or risk having the disclosure system incorporated into the
criminalization approach, which was likely favored by politicians
in order to appear tough on crime. Even if business interests were
aligned, the economic theory of regulation would not predict that
they get what they want – no new legislation addressing bribery –
because there may be other circumstances, groups, or pressures
that tilt the regulation landscape against them. 118
regarding the accounting and certification measures: The small and medium sized firms that are the membership base of the Chamber of Commerce were
expected to find it far more costly to meet the proposed legislative mandates
than large firms. Accordingly, the Chamber supported an amendment
proposed by Senator Gramm to permit the new accounting regulator to exempt
small businesses from the nonaudit services pro hibitions (it was not enacted)).
116. See Khanna, supra note 1.
117. See Koehler, supra note 15, at 988-96.
118. At the time of the FCPA’s passage, trust in business and government
was low, and it isn’t surprising that business would be generally ineffective in
achieving its presumed goals in Congress. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 76, at
1611 (discussing business political power tied to public perception). (“Mark
Smith has carefully demonstrated that when business unites behind
legislation, labor tends to be united on the other side. As a consequence, if
business “wins” it is because public opinion and election outcomes are tilting
toward business's policy position and not because of financial leverage exerted
by business over legislators. As Smith details, issues that unify business tend
to be ideological (the issue separates liberals and conservatives), partisan (the
issue separates Democrats and Republicans), and salient (the issue is highly
visible to the public). Thus, Smith finds that in these issue contexts, direct
resources or forms of power wielded by business (through campaign
contributions and lobbying capacity) do not explain legislative outcomes, but
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B. The Accounting Industry and Regulators
Understanding how and why SOX and the FCPA were passed
must include an acknowledgement that the accounting industry
(and its regulators) were at the forefront of shaping the debate in
Congress. For example, with SOX, the Senate committee did not
even hear from business interests, unlike the House, but it did
hear from the accounting industry. 119 The Senate committee
focused on the accounting profession and heard from a large
number of regulators and members of the accounting profession,
such as the American Institute for Certified Professional
Accountants. 120 Most of the witnesses for the Senate committee
were associated in some way with the SEC. 121 Ultimately, the
Senate bill was the one adopted in most part by Congress. 122
The economic theory of regulation predicts such an outcome
in both SOX and the FCPA, which also adopted many accounting
and auditing reforms and strengthened the role of the SEC
relative to its enforcement of internal monitoring. The theory
demonstrates that the accounting industry and its regulators
would stand to benefit from greater regulation and why the
accounting industry would be more successful in shaping
legislation. There are a few concepts from Posner’s economic
theory of regulation which apply: supply and demand for
regulation;
homogeneity
of
interests;
coordination
costs;
cartelization as unfeasible or highly costly; barriers to entry; and
the ability to charge supra-competitive prices. Each of these, as
applies to the accounting profession and its regulators, will be
discussed in turn.
1.

Supply and Demand of Regulation

The accounting industry has the best of both worlds. Like the
auto industry, its top players are concentrated, as discussed below.
Like the legal world, the accounting industry is part of the
public opinion polls reflecting attitudes toward business and the partisan
composition of elected lawmakers do.” Id. at n.119.
119. See Romano, supra note 76, at 1570 (“…the composition of the
witnesses differed across the chambers. Remarkably, the Senate committee
heard no witnesses from the business community, in contrast to the House,
even though business was an anticipated object of regulation and ostensibly
among the potential beneficiaries of the legislation. The business community
would, for instance, benefit from any improvement in the quality of auditing
accomplished by legislation. Instead, the Senate was more focused on the
accounting profession; it heard from a larger number of acco unting industry
regulators and members than did the House.”).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1568.
122. Oppel, supra note 48.
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“professions,” as Posner describes those industries where
cartelization is difficult but protective legislation is necessary. 123
Given the foregoing analysis regarding the supply of corporate
criminal legislation by the Congress, which often includes
accounting practices rules and regulations, the government is
clearly willing and able to produce regulation for the accounting
industry. The real question is: does the accounting industry have a
demand for it? As the next few subsections indicate, there is little
reason why the accounting industry would not at least be neutral
or indifferent toward regulation, and very likely would (and has)
benefited from erecting greater barriers to entry by making it
more difficult for accounting firms to break into the top tier of
public company accounting. This allows firms to charge higher
prices as the firms they would be auditing have an even greater
demand for their services following the passage of laws such as
SOX and FCPA. 124
2.

Homogeneity of Interests

It is important to distinguish the “Big 4” accounting firms
from the rest of the industry. 125 Their interests are different from
the “mom-and-pop” CPA shops in your hometown; the Big 4 of
KPMG, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and
PricewaterhouseCoopers dominate the public company accounting
market. 126 As such, they possess a greater interest in laws
affecting accounting of publicly-held companies, like the FCPA and
SOX, while smaller firms may not be. These laws will affect the
Big 4 equally, as the laws do not target any one particular firm or
practice in accounting done by one firm alone.
3.

Coordination Costs

The four major accounting firms are interested in the same
thing: accounting laws and regulations affecting publicly held
companies. Four firms is a rather small number, and so long as
the interests of other accountants outside of those firms are not
brought into the discussion, it should not be difficult for the Big 4
to coordinate their public outreach to affect the policy debate
regarding laws affecting the accounting industry. There is also less
likely to be free-rider problems in an industry with only four major
players. 127 Additionally, at least one study suggests that a small

123. Posner, supra note 77, at 347.
124. Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 698.
125. Accounting Services – Industry Facts and Trends, HOOVERS ,
www.hoovers.com/industry-facts.accounting-services.1299.html (last visited
Aug. 25, 2016).
126. Id.
127. Posner, supra note 77, at 349.
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increase of 50 points (on a scale of 0 to 10,000) in the HerfindhalHirschman Index (HHI), one of the primary modes of analyzing
business concentration, would put the accounting industry in
violation of antitrust guidelines. 128
4.

Cartelization is Unfeasible or Highly Costly

While four firms dominate the market for public company
accounting, actual cartelization would be unfeasible. Much like the
legal profession, the accounting industry assesses rates for its
services based on the client, the hour, the type of work involved,
etc. 129 It is a highly skill-oriented profession dependent on the
work of thousands of different certified professional accountants.
The industry could not just set a price for its services, because
there are so many of them. 130 If they set a price for one service, the
firms could compete on other dimensions in other services. Fixing
output would also be difficult for the same reason. Cartelization
will usually not occur in an industry with low initial capital costs
upfront, such as accounting, where all you need is a CPA, not an
infrastructure or heavy machinery. Additionally, the accounting
industry is highly regulated and monitored, making it unlikely
that there could be a meeting of the minds for the Big 4 in terms of
prices or output. They could, however, coordinate political
outreach strategies without violating antitrust laws. 131
5.

Barriers to Entry

Smaller accounting firms face significant barriers to entry in
the accounting industry with respect to accounting for public
companies, the target for both the FCPA and SOX. 132 Mergers in
the 1980’s and the dissolution of Arthur Andersen resulted in an
oligopoly of the “Big 4” accounting firms. 133 As such, the industry
128. See Kalpana Pai & Thomas D. Tolleson, The Capture of Government
Regulators by the Big Four Accounting Firms: Some Evidence, 13 J. OF APPL.
BUS. & ECON. 83 (2012), www.na-businesspress.com/JABE/PaiK_Web13_1_.
pdf.
129. See K. Sams, How Much Should You Pay for an Accountant?,
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS , Sept. 20, 2012,
www.nfib.com/content/resources/management/how-much-should-you-pay-foran-accountant-60944/.
130. For example, Deloitte offers many different services besides auditing.
See
Audit,
DELOITTE ,
www2.deloitte.com/us/en/services/audit.html?
icid=top_audit.
131. See, e.g., Noerr-Pennington doctrine: E. R.R. Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961); United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
132. Public Accounting Firms, Mandated Study on Consolidation and
Competition, G OV . ACCOUNT O FFICE , July 2003, www.gao.gov/assets/240/365
U.S. 127239228.pdf.
133. Id.
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is highly concentrated, ripe for cartel-like behavior. This analysis
also considers the difficulty for attaining a license as a CPA, which
further creates barriers to entry in the market for accounting in
general.
6.

Supra-Competitive pricing

Every public company needs an accountant, especially when
they are dealing with billions of dollars every year and thousands
of regulations and laws involving accounting practices. It is easier
to set your price when there are only three other major
competitors. Additionally, a highly-concentrated market with a
very inelastic demand for the services might lead to increases in
prices, as Easterbrook observed. 134

V. EFFECT OF FCPA AND SOX ON B USINESSES
Both FCPA and SOX contain civil and criminal provisions,
and both laws have proven to be substantially burdensome to
business, particularly smaller businesses. 135 Unfortunately, these
businesses possessed little influence in Congress during the debate
over passage of these laws. While accounting firms may have
benefited from the passage of the FCPA and SOX, other
businesses did not. The consequences of rent seeking – using your
resources to affect policy change to gain more resources, often at
the expense of another, e.g., lobbying 136 – can negatively affect
both those who lobbied for the rent as well as those who were in no
position to organize an opposition, such as smaller businesses.
Following the passage of the FCPA, little was done to enforce
its provisions. 137 However, businesses reported increased
compliance costs and dissatisfaction with the clarity of the
accounting provisions. 138 Today, enforcement of the FCPA has
substantially increased, and the Department of Justice issued a
100-plus-page guidance document to businesses to assist in
understanding the complexities of the law. 139 The SEC also
134. Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 698.
135. See Jason Bramwell, Survey: Public and Private Company Audit Fees
WentUp in 2013, ACCOUNTING WEB, Oct. 2, 2014, www.accountingweb.com/
practice/practice-excellence/survey-public-and-private-company-audit-feeswent-up-in-2013.
136. See Sandy Ikeda, Rent-Seeking: A Primer, Foundation for Economic
Education, Nov. 1, 2003, https://fee.org/articles/rent-seeking-a-primer/.
137. Melissa Maleske, The impact and continuing evolution of the FCPA,
INSIDE COUNSEL, May 22, 2013, www.insidecounsel.com/2013/05/22/theimpact-and-continuing-evolution-of-the-fcpa.
138. Government Accountability Office, Impact of Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on U.S. Business, Mar. 4, 1981, www.gao.gov/products/AFMD-8134.
139. U.S. Department of Justice, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign
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increased enforcement of the books-and-records provisions of the
FCPA, with a marked increase in enforcement actions since
2001. 140 In recent years, the SEC began enforcing the FCPA
outside of the judicial system through the use of non-prosecution
and deferred prosecution agreements. 141 This includes substantial
fines (tens of millions of dollars or more) for businesses that
conduct business overseas. 142 One study revealed that 63 percent
of respondents, “who included corporate executives, investment
bankers, private equity executives and hedge fund managers, say
the FCPA and anti-corruption legislation have led to aborted or
renegotiated deals such as M&A, joint ventures and distributor
relationships.”143 Businesses have struggled with the increased
enforcement of the FCPA, its complex and uncertain
interpretations, and the reality of doing business in an imperfect
world where in some countries, one person’s corruption is another
person’s standard business practice. With increased compliance
costs and enforcement penalties, businesses are understandably
on edge about the FCPA.
SOX similarly impacted business, especially small businesses.
The National Federation of Independent Businesses has been a
strong opponent of SOX and believes that the provisions in the law
harm small businesses. 144 The government has sought to extend
provisions of SOX (such as whistleblower protections) to
companies that are not even publicly traded. 145 The Supreme
Court affirmed this interpretation in a 2014 case. 146 Studies have
shown that while the initial increased costs have generally
declined for businesses as the law has aged, the impact of these
costs has disproportionately fallen on small businesses. 147 For
example, one study has shown that rules requiring independent,
non-employee directors may be much more costly to small
businesses, with small businesses paying nearly double

Corrupt Practices Act, Criminal Division, Jan. 16, 2015, www.justice.gov
/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/gu ide.pdf.
140. SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml.
141. See SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, July 14, 2016,
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml.
142. Id.
143. Lisa Lacy, The Rise and Rise of FCPA, BUSINESS INSIDER, Mar. 24,
2011, www.businessinsider.com/the-rise-and-rise-of-fcpa-2011-3.
144. See Harned, supra note 59.
145. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014), www.supremecourt.
gov/opinions/13pdf/12-3_4f57.pdf.
146. Id.
147. John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX after Ten Years: A
Multidisciplinary Review, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No.
758,
Jan. 12, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2343108.
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compensation after SOX while larger businesses only marginally
increased compensation. 148
Opponents of SOX claim that the law imposes rigid and
inflexible
rules
and
increased
overhead
costs,
which
disproportionately harm small businesses because smaller
businesses have a greater percentage of their budget devoted to
overhead. 149 The SEC’s own study of financial executives’
assessment of SOX five years after passage admits that the
majority of respondents, particularly those in smaller firms,
perceived the benefit-cost tradeoff for Section 404 internal control
compliance to be negative. 150 Moreover, the costs of compliance
with just that one section are estimated to be $2.3 million on
average and are seven times greater for smaller business than the
costs imposed on larger firms. 151
Proponents of the law have admitted that it is quite difficult
to assess the actual costs and benefits of this type of regulation;
despite six years of SOX being the law of the land, the financial
crisis of 2008 still occurred. 152 These unanswered questions raise
the concern over “political entrepreneurs” shaping laws such as
SOX rather than performance measurement and careful
consideration. 153 While determining the role that SOX played in
the financial crisis is beyond the scope of this article, it is
important to remember that those in favor of passing SOX were
adamant that its passage and greater government regulation
would help to prevent future corporate financial scandals. 154
Both the FCPA and SOX have focused on financial reporting,
and many in the accounting industry agree that these laws have
improved how businesses follow accounting rules and practices –
at least according to the Center for Audit Quality, one of the major
148. See Butler, supra note 3, at 43.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Study of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 404 Internal Control
over Financial Reporting Requirements 6, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, Office of Economic Analysis, Sept. 2009, www.sec.gov/
news/studies/2009/sox-404_study.pdf. (“The majority of respondents to this
section perceive the trade-off to be negative to varying degrees.”).
151. Jon Berlau, Republicans for Sarbanes-Oxley, NATIONAL REVIEW, Nov.
29, 2011, www.nationalreview.com/article/284269/republicans-sarbanes-oxleyjohn-berlau.
152. Julia Hanna, The Costs and Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES , Mar.
10, 2014, www.forbes.com/sites/hbsworkingknowledge/2014/03/10/the -costsand-benefits-of-sarbanes-oxley/2/#4c27a28c6a99.
(“‘The
big,
unanswered
question is whether SOX-related changes had any impact in the lead-up to the
financial crisis. Did it make things better or worse?’ says Srinivasan. ‘We don’t
know the answer to that.’”)
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 60, at 133 (statement of Rep. Jan
Schakowsky) (“The fact of the matter is we do not have the laws and
procedures in place to protect common investors. If we don’t take swift action,
I have little doubt that corporate executives’ greed and deception will victimize
more people.”).
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lobbyists for the accounting industry. 155 SOX created the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board and ended a century of selfregulation for the industry. 156 With concerns about regulatory
capture of financial regulators, 157 in particular those that regulate
accountants, it is unclear whether ending self-regulation is
necessarily a good thing. With the accounting industry dominated
by four firms and already close to the antitrust limits, it is
questionable whether regulators can do much in the future if
another Arthur Andersen incident occurs. 158 Meanwhile, those
accounting firms are protected from competition by the shear
burden of regulation now imposed on the accounting industry.
Additionally, there is substantial concern over the “revolving door”
between financial regulators and the regulated businesses, as well
as concern over the Big Four accounting firm’s influence over their
regulators. 159 Despite the central role that poor accounting
practices played in the various “corporate scandals” that led to the
passage of laws such as FCPA, SOX, and most recently, DoddFrank, the four major accounting firms are in a great position
today, with responsibility for auditing more than 80 percent of
large companies. 160
For those larger companies, the increased cost of compliance
is simply a necessity worth spending time and money, and hiring
155. See PRNewswire, Post-SOX Audit Quality Has Improved, Say
Nation’s Audit Committee Members, PRNEWSWIRE , Mar. 18, 2008,
www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/post-sox-audit-quality-has-improved-saynations-audit-committee-members-56959567.html. Others have criticized the
report as shoddy and the Center for Audit Quality as a “shill” for the
accounting industry; see Thomas I. Selling, Low Quality Stats from Center for
Audit Quality, THE ACCOUNTING O NION, Apr. 6, 2008, http://accountingonion.
typepad.com/theaccountingonion/2008/04/low-quality-sta.htm l.
156. Paul Sweeney, Sarbanes-Oxley – A Decade Later, FINANCIAL
EXECUTIVES INTERNATIONAL,
July
2012,
www.financialexecutives.org/
KenticoCMS/Financial-Executive-Magazine/2012_07/Sarbanes-Oxley--ADecade-Later.aspx#axzz3zVYpFqaA. (“Ernst & Young’s Brorsen sees creation
of the PCAOB to police the auditing profession — coupled with corporate
governance rules’ putting a public company’s board-level audit committee,
rather than company management, in charge of the auditing process — as “the
top two fundamental changes” brought about by the act. “It’s fair to say that
the largest single impact of Sarbanes-Oxley was to end 100 years of selfregulation,” he says.”).
157. Francine McKenna, File Under Regulatory Capture: Deloitte’s
“FiresideChats,” FORBES , Aug. 22, 2011, www.forbes.com/sites/francine
mckenna/2011/08/22/file-under-regulatory-capture-deloittes-firesidechats/#214636447263.
158. See Pai & Tolleson, supra note 128, at 90.
159. Charles Levinson, Accounting industry and SEC hobble America’s
audit watchdog, REUTERS , Dec. 16, 2015, www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/usa-accounting-PCAOB/.
160. Government Accountability Office, Audits of Public Companies:
Continued Concentration in Audit Market for Large Public Companies Does
Not Call for Immediate Action, Jan. 9, 2008, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08163.
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one of the four major accounting firms is a routine practice. For
smaller businesses, however, the heavy burden of compliance may
be a discouraging factor for some businesses that intend to launch
an IPO and become a public company. 161 President Obama’s 2011
Job Council report notes that an unintended consequence of SOX
was a decrease in IPO launches, particularly by smaller
businesses. 162 Smaller companies that are already public can
struggle to keep up with increased auditing fees and compliance
costs. 163
VI. CONCLUSIONS
There are important lessons to be drawn from the above
analysis of legislative history and interest group politics and how
corporate financial regulation evolved in Congress as a result of
political interests. First, and most importantly, is the notion that
certain types of interest groups, which are homogenous,
concentrated, and have the ability to act collectively – such as the
accounting profession – will have more success in crafting laws
that provide significant advantages to the incumbents of their
industry specifically. As applied to corporate financial regulatory
legislation – at least through the lenses of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the Sarbanes Oxley Act – it is clear that the
accounting industry benefited tremendously from the passage of
these laws because these laws created more work for accountants,
especially the big four firms. The more paperwork and time
accountants have to spend reviewing on behalf of a corporation,
the better for the accounting profession. With both of these laws,
auditing fees have increased, in many cases substantially, for
those least able to afford compliance – smaller businesses. 164
Moreover, the accounting industry is now well protected by
government regulators, as the cost of compliance with regulation is
significant enough to decrease competition for the auditing
business of major corporations.
Additionally, with a marked preference by the Department of
Justice and the SEC for entering into deferred and nonprosecution agreements (especially in FCPA cases)165 with
161. Martin Zwilling, 10 Reasons Why IPO Is No Longer A Good Startup
Exit, FORBES , Sept. 10, 2013, www.forbes.com/sites/martinzwilling/2013/
09/10/10-reasons-why-ipo-is-no-longer-a-good-startup-exit/#7483d4cb23dd.
162. President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, Taking Action,
Building Confidence 19, Interim Report, Oct. 2011, http://files.jobscouncil.com/jobscouncil/files/2011/10/JobsCouncil_InterimReport_Oct11.pdf.
163. See Bramwell, supra note 135; see also Al Ghosh & Robert J.
Pawlewicz, The Impact of Regulation on Auditor Fees: Evidence from the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Feb. 1, 2008, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1032642.
164. See Bramwell, supra note 135.
165. Gerald Martin, Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee, & James C.
Cooper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, An Empirical
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publicly-held companies since the collapse of Enron and the
successful but catastrophic prosecution of accounting firm Arthur
Anderson, 166 the accounting profession has perhaps a little less to
worry about today than they did early in 2002. Another major
indictment could send the accounting industry into antitrust
violations and would decrease the regulatory output of government
if only three major firms were the target of regulation. With the
requirements that executives sign all securities certifications and
businesses follow strict accounting practices now over a decade
old, there is little evidence to suggest that the accountants and
their firms have been held more accountable for corporate fraud
than before the passage of SOX. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
has also proven to be a vigorously prosecuted law against the
corporations themselves in the last decade, but at least one study
suggests that investors care more about corporations lying on their
securities statements (violating the books and records provisions)
than the actual underlying alleged bribery itself. 167 Investors
understand that business is done differently around the world, but
cannot tolerate corporate managers deceiving them and the
government on the company’s financial statements. Corporate
managers surely are aware of this, and are willing to invest
heavily in compliance, auditing, and accounting systems,
benefiting those particular industries through increased business
and fees. If individual employees end up being prosecuted more
than the company themselves, the corporation as an entity can
breathe a sigh of relief.
Another lesson from interest group theory and corporate
financial regulatory legislation is that business does not have one
agenda or always present a united front. As Judge Easterbook put
it:
To speak of “corporations” is to speak of the economy as a whole,
and therefore to speak of a disorganized and ineffectual group--the
target of small, concentrated, and therefore powerful adversaries.
Businesses are at each other's throats (this is what competition in
both product and political markets is about) and cannot collaborate
to dominate the political process. Corporations that want to emit
soot must fight off corporations that manufacture soot-control
equipment. One hundred years ago corporate holdings were more

Examination of Enforcement Trends, SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE , Sept.
2012,
www.masonlec.org/site/rte_uploads/files/FINAL%20FCPA%20REPORT
%20PDF.pdf. The study finds that 75% of all FCPA enforcement actions have
been resolved through these types of agreements since 2004.
166. David M. Uhlmann, Prosecution Deferred, Justice Denied, N.Y. TIMES ,
Dec. 14, 2013, at A23, www.nytimes.com/2013/12/14/opinion/prosecutiondeferred-justice-denied.html?_r=0.
167. Gerald Martin, Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee, & James C.
Cooper, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, Economic Impact on
Targeted Firms, SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE , June 2014, http://masonlec.
org/site/rte_uploads/files/FCPA%20II%20Final%20(6.4).pdf.
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concentrated; the House of Morgan and the Rockefellers could
mobilize political power.168

The divergence of opinion and strategy in approaching both
the FCPA and SOX bears this out: unless “business” as a whole is
united against some potential new law, various groups within
“business” will have greater influence than others. Even an
apparently united front, as seemed to be the case with the FCPA,
will not override political circumstance or pressure from competing
interest groups for provisions that favor their industry. That is the
entire point of Posner’s interest group theory and the important
lesson that applying law and economics scholarship to public
policy decisions can teach us. Concentrated, motivated industries
such as the accounting profession will have a strong incentive to
band together and affect policy, while business in general will be
unable to muster concrete, clear preferences that can be taken into
account by members of Congress, especially when the political
winds are blowing in the direction of changing public policy
immediately. 169 With both the FCPA and SOX, corporate interests
may have avoided even worse outcomes, as the substitution theory
for
corporations
preferring
criminal
to
civil
liability
demonstrates, 170 but that may be less a product of their influence
than circumstances and political realities facing Congress at the
time of passage. Moreover, the coupling of criminal provisions with
massive
new
compliance
and
regulatory
requirements,
encumbered businesses in their own right and are more
frightening today to corporate managers than the unlikely
criminal indictment of a major corporation.
Ultimately, the biggest lesson from the legislative history of
these two laws is that interest groups are not operating in a
vacuum when it comes to corporate financial regulatory
legislation. Even the accounting industry was subject to the tide of
public opinion and the political environment it created, but it
seems they made the most of it. What results may be a fait
accompli, beyond any one person or group’s control. When
Congress intends to act, it will often do so. The best that interest
groups can hope for is to achieve an optimal outcome. It would be
preferred that the outcome is one which will not come back to
haunt them in an ironic twist, much as the FCPA’s strong criminal
sanctions in lieu of disclosure has had for many corporations.
With both the FCPA and SOX, the impact of compliance on
small businesses has been substantial, and the major business
interests appearing before Congress in both of these debates may
have failed to adequately represent those most likely to be harmed
168. Easterbrook, supra note 69, at 701.
169. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 56, at 14 (statement of James K.
Glassman) (“…in times of scandal, emotions run high. And the urge to rush in
with legislative remedies is understandable, but it should be resisted.”).
170. See Khanna, supra note 1, at 117.
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by new regulation: small businesses. In future debates, corporate
leaders should be careful what they wish for and what their
lobbyists say or fail to say. If Congress is planning to do
something, do not be so sure that your preferred outcome will be
the one they choose and if they do, that it will work out to your
benefit in the long run. There is risk in playing interest group
politics, and the legislative history of the FCPA and SOX prove
that businesses have much to lose and little to gain from new
corporate financial regulation – unless they happen to be major
accounting firms.

